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This policy report is not so much a report outlining a recommended policy as much a report 
on a significant shift on HM Government policy, currently found in a draft Bill laid before 
Parliament for legislative scrutiny1. In January 2019, long-awaited government policy 
proposals began to be clarified by HM Government, in relation to the monitoring of potential 
and known domestic violence perpetrators. This clarification related to two main proposals; 
for GPS tracking of offenders and abusers; and for the use of notification requirements (a 
'domestic abusers register'), both as part of newly proposed powers for the courts. Under new 
legislative proposals contained in the draft Domestic Violence and Abuse Bill, a maximum of 
1,000 offenders in England and Wales at any one time, who were subject to orders designed 
to better protect victims of domestic abuse of stalking2, would be 'tagged' with 24-7, GPS-
based electronic monitoring devices. The draft Bill, when enacted, would see the creation of 
Domestic Abuse Protection Orders, and part of the legislation that outlines their scope would 
then give a statutory underpinning to this particular public protection surveillance measure. 
These orders would also be used to require offenders to report to the police, to notify officers 
of their personal details as part of a 'domestic abuser register' system of risk management. 
In relation to the GPS tracking proposals, the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office 
together observed in their consultation response report, and in launching the draft Bill, that: 
"We will legislate to provide for the new [domestic abuse protection notice] and 
[domestic abuse protection order]. We recognise that the new order introduces some 
untested ideas, for example in relation to the effectiveness of electronic monitoring in 
this context, and we want to continue to work with expert professionals from the 
police, courts and specialist domestic abuse sector to ensure that these new orders 
work on the ground. To this end, we will pilot the DAPN and DAPO in a number of 
police force areas. To support the introduction of the orders we will issue statutory 
guidance which will be accompanied by a programme of training and practical 
toolkits for professionals."3 
GPS tracking could be used to enforce exclusion zones around a victim's place of residence, 
or place of work, for example; and other forms of electronic monitoring devices could be 
used to enforce elements of a DAPO that entail the prohibition of an offender from drinking 
alcohol, as part of a more holistic risk-management approach. As the joint Home Office and 
Ministry of Justice report on the draft Bill notes: 
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"Electronic monitoring is not just restricted to GPS tracking. The type of electronic 
monitoring used would depend on the conditions of the order and may include 
location monitoring to ensure compliance with an exclusion zone, radio frequency 
monitoring to ensure compliance with a curfew, or alcohol monitoring to comply with 
a positive requirement to attend an alcohol course."4 
As a public protection premise, the police can monitor through GPS-enabled tracking those 
strongly suspected of, or at least those already charged/convicted of domestic violence 
offences and/or stalking. But as a piece of public policy this would, under the workings of the 
rule of law in the UK, require legislative effort to create a means by which the private life of 
such an offender could be interfered with 'in accordance with the law', and only when 
necessary and proportionate5.   
This policy approach would indeed likely require new legislation, on top of considerable 
investment in the electronic monitoring of offenders who are, for example, serial domestic 
violence perpetrators. In terms of such a constitutional preference for fresh and dedicated 
statutory provisions, the European Court of Human Rights has maintained in MM v UK 
[2012] ECHR 1906 at para. 193 that: 
"The requirement that any interference must be ‘in accordance with the law’ under 
Article 8.2 means that the impugned measure must have some basis in domestic law 
and be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the preamble 
to the Convention and inherent in the object and purpose of Article 8. The law must 
thus be adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is, formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable the individual – if need be with appropriate advice – to regulate 
his conduct. For domestic law to meet these requirements, it must afford adequate 
legal protection against arbitrariness and accordingly indicate with sufficient clarity 
the scope of discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its 
exercise…" 
The government certainly now seem conscious that a specific statutory regime for the more 
intensive use of different types of electronic monitoring in the ways outlined above would 
better survive the 'in accordance with the law' test in European human rights law, particularly 
concerning the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR, if it were 
based in clear statutory provisions. The government report noted that: 
"We understand that, without legal powers, the courts are limited in how they can 
apply electronic monitoring. We think that the courts should have an express power to 
impose electronic monitoring, and we would also include a set of statutory safeguards 
to ensure that electronic monitoring is only used when necessary and 
proportionate…"6, [and] "a court will only be able to impose an electronic monitoring 
requirement where necessary and proportionate to protect a victim of domestic 
abuse."7 
In actual fact, the courts have already applied the concept of what is required by the notion of 
'in accordance with law' under Article 8 ECJR with some degree of latitude, and in favour of 
                                            
4 n 2, p.30. 
 
5 See R (T) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 35. 
 
6 n 2, p.30. 
 
7 n 2, p.31.   
 
a public protection perspective, in the context of GPS tracking. In the judgment in the case of 
Richards, from the Court of Appeal in 2015, there was an (unsuccessful) argument that such 
GPS monitoring was unlawful, as it had no explicit statutory basis8. The new legislation 
would remedy this shortcoming in the statutory landscape of public protection powers and 
safeguards. But the court in the Richards case actually "emphasised that the police did indeed 
have sufficient (lawful) guidance from ACPO as to the management of “police information” 
and, furthermore, sufficiently clear (and lawful) guidance as to how this personal data could 
be both retained and shared for public protection purposes"9, and therefore there was no need 
for specific statutory underpinning for the use of the technology concerned. So the inclusion 
of a specific statutory basis for such GPS monitoring in the draft Bill in 2019 is perhaps not 
strictly necessary, when there would be an overarching statutory regime to indicate the 
purpose of the new domestic abuse protection orders. Detailed statutory provisions on GPS 
tracking of (possible) domestic violence perpetrators, namely those in cl.33 in the draft Bill, 
are though most welcome from the perspective of ensuring specificity and democratically-
rooted accountability in the practice of monitoring dangerous individuals in UK society.    
Around the time the Richards judgment was handed down, in 2015, police in Northumbria 
began piloting a voluntary scheme through which offenders would be monitored through GPS 
devices. These individuals were GPS monitored as to their location in relation to a particular 
victim or potential victim, who in turn could be alerted through a personal handheld device as 
to their proximity to the perpetrator concerned10. Davies and Biddle have highlighted, in a 
broadly positive evaluation of the efficacy of a (resource-intensive) mix of different multi-
agency interventions, that such GPS-enabled monitoring can play a useful role in a 'Domestic 
Abuse Perpetrator [Management] Toolkit'. The authors explain that: 
"[The] Domestic Abuse Proximity System (DAPS)… is a non-statutory two-piece 
GPS system designed to improve victim safety and confidence. The perpetrator is 
provided with an ankle tag with a GPS tracking unit, which they wear whenever they 
leave their home. The victim also carries a device, a handset that uses the same GPS 
location technologies. Fixed exclusion zones are set up around appropriate locations, 
which the perpetrator is banned from entering and the victim and monitoring centre is 
alerted if the perpetrator is within 500 m of them."11 
 
There are of course, too, the possible new notification requirements outlined by HM 
Government as a new policy direction in managing domestic violence perpetrators, under the 
proposed DAPOs, and described in cl.37 of the draft Bill. In fact, this is the approach that the 
Home Affairs Select Committee had recently approved in their October 2018 report on 
domestic abuse. The Committee report noted that expert witnesses to their inquiry had 
observed that " …the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (“Clare’s Law”) was dependent 
on an individual asking about an offender’s history and recommended that the focus be 
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changed so that offenders were tracked as a matter of course by police officers…"12; leading 
to their recommendation as a Committee that "… a national register of serial stalkers and 
domestic violence perpetrators… is introduced as a matter of urgency and that individuals 
placed on the register should, like registered sex offenders, be managed through multi-agency 
public protection arrangements (MAPPA)."13  
In essence HM Government have now concurred with the Home Affairs Select Committee in 
their own more recent report, observing that they 
"… think that the DAPO should include notification requirements. This means that, if 
it would assist in preventing further abuse, those who are subject to a DAPO would 
have to register certain personal details with the police. These details might include 
their address, who they live with, and details of intimate relationships and their access 
to any associated children. These details would allow the police to make an accurate 
risk assessment of the danger that person poses."14 
So this is not quite proactive 'tracking', per se, of serial domestic violence perpetrators, but it 
is a step toward more careful risk management structures and regulation for the policing of 
domestic violence in England and Wales15. It will be important, though, for the Home Office 
and the Ministry of Justice to carefully work these new offender monitoring conditions and 
other approaches, including GPS monitoring, into the overall policing strategy in relation to 
the push to use of out-of-court disposals. The latest version of the relevant strategy published 
by the National Police Chiefs' Council has noted that there should be "greater autonomy in 
out of court disposal decision making for the police service, specifically for conditional 
cautions for domestic abuse… if an evidence base is developed showing the benefits of such 
as approach"16. 
Of course, too, there is a risk that lawful and more creatively-deployed electronic monitoring 
technologies will be seen as a kind of 'silver bullet' for the management of the risk that 
domestic violence perpetrators pose. So there are some obvious questions to investigate 
through the forthcoming piloting process: what about the risk of technical equipment failure 
in relation to an offender being monitored? What data protection-based challenges will the 
courts expect to deal with if GPS monitoring data is used in a newer way in some multi-
agency setting? What are the overall end-to-end costs of the technology to be chosen and 
deployed, including human resources and training costs? And what sort of detailed guidance 
will the police and the courts receive from the Ministry of Justice, respectively, following the 
forthcoming pilot stage, in terms of how to decide who are the 1,000 riskiest domestic 
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violence perpetrators nationally who should be placed under GPC monitoring in different 
ways? 
At the time of writing, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights has started its 
legislative scrutiny process of the draft Bill17, and it remains to be seen as to what the 
eventual formulation and balance for new powers for the police and the courts will actually 
be, in terms of monitoring and risk-assessing dangerous offenders in relation to preventing 
domestic violence and related crimes.  
 
                                            
17See: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-
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